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Towards a Banking Union: Open Issues 
A report by Prof Christian de Boissieu i* 
 
Executive summary 
The purpose of this paper is to give an account of the debates regarding the implementation 
of a banking union in Europe that took place in Bruges in April 2013 at a Conference co-
organised by the College of Europe and the European Commission's Joint Research Centre 
(JRC). The benefits to be expected from the banking union are reviewed. Then its 
components are analysed and discussed with a special focus on supervision and resolution of 
banks. The challenges are both functional and institutional. They involve micro-and macro 
prudential considerations. As regards the ECB, will there be possible conflicts of objectives 
and conflicts of interest when it cumulates its monetary policy function with its new 
supervisory role? For banking supervision, how to combine the division of labour between 
the ECB and the national competent authorities with the necessary coordination between 
them?  
The same kind of challenge applies to resolution and deposit insurance. The paper relates 
the transition to a banking union to other structural issues such as the separation of bank 
activities and the financing of the real economy in the new regulatory framework. 
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1. Background 
On 18 April 2013 the College of Europe (Bruges) hosted the second Conference on the 
general theme “ Scientific  Support to Financial Stability”, co-organised by the European 
Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC) and the College of Europe. The first Conference 
took place in November 2012 in Brussels and was devoted to the scientific support for 
analysis of systemic risks and of policies dealing with them (most of the presentations are 
available on the websites of the JRC and the College of Europe). The April 2013 Bruges 
Conference was entitled “Towards a Banking Union: Open Issues”. As with the Brussels 
Conference, it gathered high-ranking financial experts, EU policy makers, representatives 
from the ECB, the EIB, the EBA, the US Federal Reserve System, academics, bankers, as well 
as representatives of the European Banking Federation and of the European Consumers 
Organisation (BEUC). It was opened by Michel Barnier, Commissioner for Internal Market 
and Services, and co-chaired by Rector Paul Demaret (College of Europe) and Dominique 
Ristori (Director-General of the JRC). 
Access to reliable, independent and comparable data is key to the banking union (hereafter 
BU), since transparency of bank data is a prerequisite for an effective supervision and 
resolution by the competent authorities. All the speakers acknowledged both the necessity 
and the difficulty in improving access to the relevant banking and financial data. For instance 
Francesca Campolongo (JRC) referred to the permanent “struggle” to find good data and to 
improve data disclosure in particular by banks. It is worth noting that “market discipline” is 
at the core of Pillar 3 of Basel II and Basel III and it implies more and better information 
disclosure by banks to all stakeholders. Monique Goyens (BEUC and member of the Liikanen 
Group) referred even to a “battle of data”, questioning the role of financial industry-led 
research which is not independent enough. This was a view which was strongly opposed by 
Wim Mijs (European Banking Federation) who stressed the positive–sum game between the 
regulators, the bankers, the stakeholders and the public at large regarding the collection and 
treatment of the relevant data. 
The obstacles to reliable and comparable data are manifold: excessive financial complexity 
(e.g., some exotic derivatives instruments), the difficult ex-ante assessment of risks, 
persistent divergence across Member States in the accounting and evaluation procedures 
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despite their reliance on the same accounting rules (IFRS). Therefore it is not surprising that 
the ECB’s comprehensive assessment of banks in the euro area which was scheduled to start 
in November 2013 and end in November 2014 emphasises more transparency for the 
purpose of “enhancing the quality of information available on the condition of banks”. 
The JRC in cooperation with DG MARKT has built the model SYMBOL (Systemic Model of 
Bank Originated Losses) which assesses the financial position of individual banks and the 
macro implications under exogenous shocks. This model is still in progress since the 
collection of detailed and reliable data is indispensable. However, it is already a useful tool 
for assessing the probability of default of each bank. It takes into account contagion effects 
on the inter-bank market in order to analyse the micro/macro links, in particular the 
channels of transmission from individual bank risks (credit risks, market risks, operational 
risks) to systemic risks and to simulate the impact of various shocks. In this respect such a  
modelisation could be very useful in the implementation of bank stress tests and in the 
assessment on an ex-ante basis of the conditions and implications of the transition to a BU. 
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2. Benefits of banking union 
R.Goyal et al. (2013) presents a comprehensive survey of the economic foundations of the 
BU. The Bruges Conference was an occasion for revisiting the main arguments. 
Without being exhaustive, it can be argued that the BU in Europe is a means towards the 
following goals: 
(i) To deepen the single market for financial services and make it more effective. We are 
still far from an effective single market for banking and financial services and a true 
level playing field. One of the goals of BU is to make the single market a reality in 
particular through a “single rulebook”. However there is a debate on the financial re-
regulation process and the effectiveness of the single market. Commissioner Michel 
Barnier stressed that the single rulebook has been significantly enhanced by the final 
version of CRD IV (Basel III) which tightens the requirements for bank capital, liquidity 
and governance. Wim Mijs (European Banking Federation) regretted that even CRD IV 
leaves too much room to the competent national authorities to incorporate 
idiosyncratic measures in the transposition of the directive and in particular in its 
interpretation, in such a way that we could be very far from a real level playing field. 
Likewise Karel Lannoo (CEPS) underlined the fact that according to CRD IV the national 
authorities keep some discretionary power for the weights attached to real estate or 
for the implementation (or not) of the counter-cyclical buffer. This ongoing debate 
means that we will have to find the right balance between coordination and 
decentralisation as regards the concrete implementation of Basel III. The BU implies 
also such a search and clarification. 
(ii) To overcome the current fragmentation of financial markets in Europe. This is another 
way to look at the single market puzzle. The euro zone crisis has generated diverging 
interest rates and increasing spreads over the whole yield curve. Banks in countries 
under pressure still pay a premium on their debt compared to banks in core countries. 
The crisis has also fuelled an augmented “domestic bias” for investors, a partial 
repatriation of financial assets, some form of “re-nationalisation” of private savings 
and the necessity to compensate the private capital flows from the South (Greece, 
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Portugal, Spain) to the North of Europe by some public transfers from the North to the 
South. In this connection, Frank Smets (ECB) started from the basic objective to return 
to a globalised finance in the EU and not only in the euro area. 
(iii) To overcome the “impossible trinity”. D. Schoenmaker (2011), referring to the concept 
of “financial trilemma”, underlined the fact that we cannot have the three sides 
together: financial integration, financial stability and national policies for crisis 
prevention and management. If we want to maintain financial integration and to reach 
financial stability, we must pass to some supra-national policies for the management 
of financial crises. This financial trilemma is as important for financial matters as the 
Mundell-Padoa-Schioppa impossibility triangle is for monetary policy in an open 
economy with perfect capital mobility. 
(iv) To go out of the vicious loop between banks and sovereigns. Several speakers 
including Klaus Trömel (EIB) and Frank Smets emphasised the benefits to be had from 
a BU in this regard. The euro zone crisis has illustrated the manifold and bi-directional 
links between banks and sovereigns. In several cases the systemic banking crisis 
associated with private over-indebtedness has led to state intervention as an investor 
of last resort in the banking sector and to an outburst in the public debt ratio (Ireland, 
Spain). Among other examples, the Cypriot crisis illustrates the negative impact of non-
performing sovereign debt on individual banks and on the banking system as a whole. 
In many cases, spreads are the main channel of transmission from the sovereign to 
corporate debt (including bank debt). What to expect and what not to expect from the 
BU regarding the bank/sovereign loop? Banks will continue to buy sovereign debt, 
induced to do so by the scale of weights embedded in Basel III. But an effective 
supervision at the European level means that the supervisors would be in a better 
position to contain on an ex-ante basis the accumulation of bad debts on bank 
balance-sheets. Moreover, a Spanish or an Irish scenario would be much less likely 
since the resolution of banks in the BU would rely on public funding as the last, not the 
first, solution. Compared to the pre-BU configuration, the probability for a bank crisis 
morphing into a sovereign debt crisis will significantly decrease, although it will not be 
zero. 
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(v) To internalise externalities. The presence of externalities – either positive or negative – 
leads to under - or over - utilisation of some instruments. Frank Smets pointed to the 
risk of under-capitalised banks if the decisions were mostly taken at the national level. 
Here we come back to the classical argument à la Tinbergen (1954): the presence of 
externalities pushes towards coordination or even centralisation (which represents the 
highest degree of coordination) of policy instruments. Cross-border banking and 
financial activities in the EU are still significant despite the recent fragmentation. The 
Cyprus crisis shows that spill-over effects fuelled by expectations and contagion could 
create a systemic problem from a configuration which was difficult to characterise as 
“systemic” on a purely ex-ante basis. Potential negative externalities for the rest of 
Europe came from the initial and counter–productive decision of the Eurogroup to tax 
all deposits. De facto the final decision to exonerate deposits up to EUR 100,000 
limited the externalities for depositors in the rest of the EU. The Cyprus crisis shows 
that the transition from individual to systemic risks is much more complex than usually 
appreciated. It deserves more scientific and policy attention. The magnitude of 
externalities across Member States explains the creation of the three European 
regulatory and supervisory bodies (ESMA, EBA, EIOPA) according to the 
recommendations of the de Larosière report made before the euro zone crisis. This 
crisis means that we must go further regarding the internalisation of financial 
externalities. 
(vi) To reduce the risk of capture of regulators by the financial industry. The argument is 
extensively discussed in the academic literature especially in light of the crisis and the 
growing focus on conflicts of interest. Supervision and resolution taken at the national 
level would entail a risk of regulatory forbearance. This argument validates more 
integration and centralisation. At the Bruges Conference it was only incidentally 
mentioned by Monique Goyens who questioned the data collected by the industry. 
The idea that a supervisory mechanism centralised at the European level would be less 
exposed to lobbies and pressures is based on the notion of “distance” from vested 
interests which are supposed to be more powerful at the national level than at the EU 
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level. Here the word distance could have several meanings: for sure geographic, but 
also functional, political, institutional, etc. 
The emphasis on the benefits to be had from BU does not mean that there are no costs. F. 
Campolongo reminded us that science must develop ex-ante assessment of the discounted 
cost-benefits of such a major economic and political project. The main challenge is to 
quantify so many qualitative changes and to value numerous externalities. 
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3. The Single Supervisory Mechanism(SSM) 
3.1 The three pillars and their sequencing 
BU rests on three pillars: A Single Supervisory Mechanism, a Single Resolution Mechanism 
and an integrated scheme of deposit insurance (the Report considers later the meaning of 
an “integrated” scheme since the debate is still very open). The fact that Basel II and III also 
rest on three pillars does not imply that “three” has become the golden figure of financial 
regulation. This convergence is purely coincidental. 
The three pillars of BU form a consistent system. Many speakers including Commissioner 
Barnier, Frank Smets or Martin Merlin (European Commission, DG MARKT) underlined that 
the three pillars cannot be decoupled from each other. But, on the other hand, since BU 
relies not on shock therapy but rather gradualism, proper sequencing is both required and 
fundamental. 
It should take place in the following order: supervision, then resolution of banks and, at the 
end, deposit guarantee. Not in the steady state but during the transition period which is 
expected to last at least a couple of years, the EU will face a dilemma: how to implement a 
credible and effective BU when it will be piecemeal during the transition phase, given the 
lags in effect between the respective integration of supervision, resolution and deposit 
insurance. The solution could be the following: extending the monetary policy debate to 
financial regulation. In order to be time-consistent, each stage of the BU must be set in such 
a way that it is perfectly consistent with and conducive to the later stages. From the 
functional viewpoint the three stages (one for each pillar) are not separable even if they will 
be implemented successively. This is what may be called the non-separability principle. 
3.2. Who should be in charge of what? 
The central role of the ECB 
For several reasons, at the Bruges Conference no one, including the academics, really 
questioned the central role of the ECB in the SSM. First, the SSM will benefit from the global 
reputation and credibility of the ECB. Second, and this argument is closely connected with 
the preceding one, the independence and “distance” of the ECB from national authorities 
will be valuable features of the SSM. Third, the ECB has a comparative advantage in 
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collecting micro-economic information about bank condition and risks, and this advantage 
has been rather increasing with the implementation of unconventional monetary policy 
which requires more transparency about bank balance-sheets. F. Smets reminds us that out 
of the 17 national central banks of the Eurosystem (before the entry of Latvia in the euro 
area as of January 2014), 15 are already deeply involved in bank supervision. Fourth, other 
scenarios are not fully credible. For instance, the EBA is fulfilling a useful function when it 
prepares and publishes bank stress tests. To put it at the core of the SSM would raise a 
whole bunch of operational, legal and governance issues. The accepted idea is to give the 
leadership to the ECB but to benefit from more coordination between the ECB, the EBA and 
other existing institutions. 
Given the fact that there are about 8200 banks in the EU and 6000 in the euro area as 
recalled by Commissioner Barnier, the ECB will start its supervisory activity as of November 
2014 by directly supervising the most “significant” banks of the eurozone, namely around 
130, which taken together represent a market share of 80% to 85% of bank assets in the 
euro area. Given the list of SIFIs published each November by the FSB which includes 28 
banks at world level (as of November 2012) of which 16 are European banks, it means that 
the ECB will directly supervise many non-SIFI but “significant” banks. For a bank to be 
qualified “systemic” or “significant” the relevant criteria are: the size, the density of 
connexions with other banks and the extent of externalities, etc. The difference between the 
two concepts is more a question of degree than of substance. 
In order to fulfil its supervisory function the ECB needs to recruit staff. It has to hire between 
800 and 1000 supervisors coming from national supervisory bodies, banks, the private sector 
at large, and universities. The staffing implication of the BU for the ECB must not be 
underestimated. As regards the recruitment of experts in bank supervision, a zero-sum game 
between the ECB and the national competent authorities (NCAs) must be avoided. The way 
to do so is to hire qualified people well beyond the circle of central bankers. 
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The review of banks’ balance sheets 
In November 2013 the ECB just started an assessment exercise which will be carried out 
through to November 2014 just at the time when the ECB will be taking over its supervisory 
role. As put forward by the ECB itself, the review of banks’ balance sheets has three (three 
again!) goals. 1) Transparency: to enhance the available information on banks. Therefore this 
objective could be related to pillar 2 of Basel II and III which has to do with “market 
discipline”. Mario Draghi spoke of the need to “dispel the fog” around bank balance sheets 
in the euro area. In light of the eurozone crisis, this is the number one goal. 2) Repair: to 
identify and implement prompt corrective actions if necessary. 3) Confidence building: all 
bank stakeholders are potential targets of this confidence-building exercise. 
The ECB will carry out its assessment review with the support of NCAs and the expertise of 
Oliver Wyman, a consulting firm. The sample consists of 130 “significant” banks, namely the 
banks which are going to be directly supervised by the ECB, from 18 countries (for the 
exercise, Latvia is already in the eurozone): 24 banks from Germany, 16 from Spain, 15 from 
Italy, 13 from France and fewer where the banking concentration ratio is much higher (5 
banks from Ireland, 4 from Cyprus, 4 from Greece). The overall assessment will bear on 
standard items such as the bank's “own” funds, liquidity, risks, the quality of bank 
management and governance, etc. In close cooperation with the NCAs and Oliver Wyman, 
the ECB wants to develop its own rating methodology which is not to be a pure replication of 
the ratings applied by US supervisors. 
The necessity of coordination 
At the Bruges Conference, much attention was devoted to the coordination problem: i) the 
cooperation between the ECB and the NCAs as regards the concrete functioning of the SSM; 
ii) the relationships between the ECB and other existing bodies also in charge of prudential 
policy. 
The first aspect raises a difficult but relevant issue. What will be for the SSM, both during the 
transition phase and in the steady-state regime, the balance between centralisation forces 
giving a growing role to the ECB, and decentralisation forces maintaining a very significant 
role for NCAs because of their privileged access to local information, of the valuable 
argument of “proximity” (which is a multidimensional concept: geographic, cultural, 
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political)? The answer, which is quite impossible to provide on an ex-ante basis, will lie in the 
combination of two necessities: The fruitful division of labour between the ECB and the 
NCAs (in many cases the national central banks or institutions which are closely related to 
them), and the necessary cooperation between them. In one way or another, the question 
was raised by Charles Goodhart (LSE), Frank Smets, Wim Mijs and Karel Lannoo. The basic 
split between large banks directly supervised by the ECB and the small and medium-sized 
banks directly supervised by the national authorities is useful and apparently clear-cut. But 
even the size criterion will pave the way for some overlapping and competition between the 
“centre” and the “periphery”. This wording is not intended to be pejorative in view of the 
fact that the NCAs will continue to care for their “significant” banks whereas the ECB cannot 
neglect small and medium-sized banks in light of the Cyprus crisis and some other banking 
crises. 
To be more concrete, let us consider two examples which raise the issue of the optimum 
degree of centralisation (or decentralisation) within the SSM. 
With Basel II and Basel III, the supervisors have to assess the quality of internal models used 
by banks (in particular the A-IRB models for “advanced internal rating based”) to compute 
their risk-weighted assets (RWA). This referee function is crucial for comparing and rating 
bank internal models and therefore creating a level playing field. In the SSM, the ECB and the 
NCAs will have to cooperate to fulfil this function. De facto, the ECB will be more involved in 
the rating of large banks’ internal models while the NCAs will focus more on small and 
medium-sized banks (by the way those banks mostly rely on the standard model or on the 
Foundation-IRB). But the two levels of decision have to be fully consistent since any 
significant discrepancy between them could generate competitive distortions. 
A second example relates to the implementation of pillar 2 of Basel II and III, i.e. the 
competence of supervisors to tighten up the solvency ratios required from a bank above the 
regulatory thresholds given the specific risk profile of this bank. The concrete exercise of 
such a discretionary power in the SSM will also imply a high degree of consistency and 
coordination between the “centre” and the “periphery”. 
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The other aspect of the coordination puzzle concerns the relationships between the ECB and 
other existing institutions at the European level. Charles Goodhart questioned the role and 
the very existence of the ESRB (European Systemic Risk Board) which is too a large group 
(about 60 people around the table) without any executive power and with no impact on the 
decision-making process. It has not issued any recommendation to any authority (Cyprus, 
Slovenia, etc). On the contrary Karel Lannoo pointed out to the usefulness of the ESRB when 
it made some strong recommendations concerning money market funds at the end of 2012 
and when it published scoreboards concerning systemic risks. 
What will be the role of the EBA when a full BU is in place? No one really questioned the 
very existence of EBA. But it will have to adjust to the new institutional framework. Piers 
Habens (EBA) underlined the fact that the EBA could contribute to many aspects of the BU 
except that it cannot provide liquidity in case of a need for it. Philippe Herzog 
(Confrontations Europe) pointed out the fundamental limits of EBA due to the fact that it is 
not a regulator. Charles Goodhart came back to the relationship between the EBA and the 
ESRB. What can be considered fairly certain, in view of the many uncertainties, is that EBA 
will continue to be deeply involved in bank stress tests in cooperation with the ECB and the 
NCAs. The participation of EBA in the current assessment of banks by the ECB is a positive 
token of the prevailing spirit of cooperation (rather than competition) between the various 
stakeholders of the BU. As put forward by Frank Smets, we are here also confronted with the 
question of what is the best incentive structure to fulfil the objectives defined by the 
European and national policy-makers. The question of the optimal incentives structure was 
mentioned but not really studied at the Conference. 
3.3 Conflicts of objectives? Conflicts of interest? 
Micro-and macro prudential measures 
Banking supervision is mostly micro-prudential. It is a continuous policy applied to all 
relevant financial institutions. Charles Goodhart underlined the unavoidable “granularity” of 
macro-prudential measures, namely the necessity to index them on the economic cycle in 
order to limit their pro-cyclicality and if possible to make them contra-cyclical: “…macro-
prudential measures are meant to be varied, and perhaps subsequently relaxed, over the 
course of the cycle…” 
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At present, this principle is widely accepted, whereas its concrete implementation is much 
more problematic. It suffices to refer to the status of the counter-cyclical buffer in Basel III, 
left to the discretionary appreciation of each national competent authority, or the on-going 
debate since the London 2009 G20 summit about bank dynamic (or ex-ante) provisioning. 
The concept of granularity is more complex, since, as underlined by Goodhart, it refers also 
to the optimal aggregation level for macro-prudential policy. Here the optimum is not 
necessarily the most aggregated level, and I would support the suggestion that prudential 
policy must also be “meso” oriented by looking at intermediate–level patterns (e.g., prices 
on local or regional real estate markets). This is a form of geographic selectivity and fine-
tuning. 
Goodhart pointed out also to an empirical asymmetry. It is much easier to tighten up 
banking and financial regulation in a boom than it is to relax it in a bust. Some empirical 
evidence of this asymmetry comes from a background IMF paper on macro-prudential 
policy. Moreover micro and macro-prudential policies could work in opposite directions. 
Whereas during the boom both micro-and macro policies converge to tightening (higher 
capital and liquidity requirements), they diverge during the bust with micro-policy pushing 
towards tougher measures and macro-policy trying to “lean against the wind” (i.e. to be 
contra-cyclical by lowering relevant ratios). Here there is a clear conflict of objectives within 
the overall prudential policy and the need for more instruments to reach the various 
objectives attached to financial stability. This is another application of the Tinbergen rule, 
but we have also to consider the Mundell rule. That is, how to assign the different prudential 
measures to the various goals of financial stability? We would need here more research and 
academic analysis. 
How to encourage banks to lend more during a bust? Goodhart gave the example of the UK 
Funding for Lending Scheme as a vehicle for such a contra-cyclical policy. New loans granted 
during the bust phase would have a lower weight than the stock of “old” credits. With this 
proposal, we come back to an issue which will remain open for long. Could we assess and 
implement the optimal degree of granularity and selectiveness as regards geographic and 
temporal criteria? The split between micro and macro-measures is necessary but not 
sufficient, and in many respects we have to go beyond. 
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Potential conflicts within the ECB 
Possible trade-offs between monetary and prudential polices are well-known and 
documented. At the Bruges Conference, the topic was raised but was not examined at 
length. It is known that such a trade-off could occur when monetary policy has to be 
tightened. The higher interest rate warranted from the monetary policy viewpoint could 
enhance the fragility of some banks whose assets are indexed on market rates. The impact 
could therefore challenge the supervisory function of the central bank. 
There exists another potential conflict which is both functional and institutional. It relates to 
the links between the Governing Council and the Supervisory Board of the ECB. Several 
speakers addressed this issue during the Bruges Conference. One option would have been 
the full separation between the two bodies, the Governing Council being no more than an 
observer at the Supervisory Board (and vice-versa). There will be some overlapping as 
regards the membership of the two Boards. A huge dose of pragmatism is required. It seems 
more prudent to adapt the composition of the Supervisory Board after a couple of years of 
experience. 
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4. The Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) 
From the viewpoint of sequencing, the SRM is the second pillar of the BU. The problem of 
bank resolution was alluded to at the Washington DC G20 Summit in November 2008 which 
called for a review of resolution regimes and bankruptcy laws “to ensure that they permit an 
orderly wind-down of large complex cross-border financial institutions”. Due to the impact 
of the euro zone crisis on banks the challenge of resolution has become still more topical. A 
sense of emergency has developed in particular after the Cyprus crisis. The draft directive for 
“establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and 
investment firms” was adopted by the Council of the EU last June. As of November 2013, it is 
still going through a trilogue (Council, Commission and European Parliament). On 8 
November 2013 the ECB published its opinion on the SRM, which is examined in more detail 
below. 
At the Bruges Conference, Martin Merlin (DG MARKT) presented a comprehensive overview 
of the main debates and options concerning bank resolution. I draw extensively on his 
presentation at the Conference. 
4.1 The legal basis for bank resolution 
At the time of the Bruges Conference the debate about the legal basis for bank resolution 
was still lively. For sure there was and there is a consensus not to change the Treaties for this 
purpose. This is a sound position given the general mood in Europe and the economic and 
social circumstances. But as explained by M. Merlin there was a possible choice between 
Article 352 of the EU Treaty [Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union] which is not 
specific at all and requires Council unanimity, and Article 114 TFEU which is more precise 
since it is the traditional legal basis for the single market. Moreover, Article 114 requires only 
qualified majority for adoption by the Council and fits well with the general objectives of 
resolution. After all, the SRM will facilitate the orderly resolution of cross-border banking 
groups and this is a single market issue. 
Here the cross-border dimension of bank activity is underlined, but the SRM will be 
applicable to any credit institution “failing or likely to fail” whatever the respective weights 
of purely domestic and cross-border operations in its net product. The legal debate is over, 
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at least for now (but we cannot discard completely the scenario of legal and judiciary 
disputes). Both the Council in June and the ECB in November 2013 explicitly referred to 
Article 114 and the strengthening of the single market: “This would make the establishment 
of the SRM possible without the need for a Treaty change” (ECB press release, 8 November 
2013). A comprehensive analysis of the legal basis for resolution and an option in favour of 
combining articles 114 and 352 are proposed by S. Micossi et al. (November 2013). 
4.2 The basic ingredients of bank resolution 
The general idea is to set up a Single Resolution Board (SRB) which will work in close 
cooperation with the NCAs. As for supervision, the debate concerning the balance between 
centralisation versus decentralisation forces exists also for resolution. However Martin 
Merlin pointed out that the size criterion which is relevant to assign responsibilities between 
the ECB and national supervisors applies less to resolution. The SRM will cover all banks 
whatever their size and “significance”. In this respect the ECB’s view is at odds with that of 
the German authorities. Mr W. Schäuble, the German Minister of Finance, has repeatedly 
said that the SRM must work as a network of the NCAs rather than as a centralised authority. 
This is not the view of the Commission, the ECB, the Council, and many other member 
countries. There is even no place for a two-tier resolution system based on a size criterion as 
it could be for supervision. Nevertheless there could be no real decoupling between 
supervision and resolution. First, there exists a logical sequencing. The SSM (either the ECB 
or the NCAs) should be solely responsible for assessing whether a credit institution is failing 
or likely to fail. The supervisory assessment will therefore be a necessary precondition for 
putting an institution into resolution. Second, the relevant geographic areas for the SSM and 
the SRM have to coincide. A country cannot be part of one without participating to the 
other. As already mentioned, this is what the non-separability principle dictates. 
Who should be the institution for the SRM? In theory several options were available and 
Martin Merlin identified various candidates: a European institution such as the Commission, 
the Council, the ECB; some  agency such as the EBA or a new agency to be put in place; the 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM) which has become the fiscal backstop of rescue 
programmes. For many reasons, namely the search for an independent authority and the 
need to avoid conflicts of interest, the second solution has been selected. The institution for 
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the SRM should not be the EBA but a new and specialised agency fully distinct from the ECB 
and the Commission. Officially the SRM must start operations as of 1 January 2015, a few 
months after the start of the SSM. Andrea Enria, who chairs the EBA, has been recently 
advocating more integration against the network of national authorities approach: “You 
need European decision mechanisms rather than having always a committee-type of 
decision in a crisis” (Financial Times, 18 November 2013). According to him, it is vital to give 
more power to EU institutions especially for bank resolution. Ex post most speakers at the 
Bruges Conference would have endorsed such a position. 
4.3 Organising bail-in procedures 
The main objective of the new procedure is to count on private rather than on public money 
whenever a bank in the euro area is failing or likely to fail. Bail-in must be the rule, bail-out 
the exception. States and taxpayers will become payers of last resort, not of first resort as 
they were in 2007-2010 and more recently with the Irish, Spanish and Cypriot crises due to 
the systemic nature of those crises and the prevalence of the “too big to fail” argument. 
Before coming to resolution, everything must be done to avoid such a situation through the 
adoption of preventive measures, early intervention with the power given to the Authorities 
(European and national) to appoint a new management in case of a significant deterioration 
in the bank’s financial situation or of serious violations of the law. Resolution itself is a 
multidimensional procedure since it could involve several steps such as partial sale of bank 
business, defeasance operations (transfer of impaired assets to a special vehicle) and bail-in 
measures. Indeed a concise definition of bail-in has been put forward by the EU: “…the 
imposition of losses, with an order of seniority, on shareholders and unsecured creditors”. 
The directive on recovery and resolution introduces a strong hierarchy in the means to 
resolve a bank. The hierarchy embedded in the procedure is so strong that it is comparable 
to what is called a lexicographic order in decision theory. First, shareholders are solicited for 
a recapitalisation. Second in order are creditors, in particular the ordinary, unsecured, non-
preferred creditors. In any case creditors cannot suffer greater losses than they would have 
under the ordinary national insolvency procedure.  Third, we have uninsured depositors. 
There is a long list of creditors and liabilities not eligible for bail-in procedures. For example, 
covered deposits (i.e. up to 100,000 euros) are excluded from bail-in. Fourth, states 
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(including the ESM at the European level) and taxpayers will be last resort contributors. This 
ranking is reasonable. It has to be consistent with the company law of Member States, which 
could still vary across countries despite the adoption of several EU directives in this field. In 
some cases national company law for bankruptcy will have to be adjusted to the new 
configuration created by the resolution directive. In practice, in light of past experiences, it is 
not evident that appeal to public money will become an exception and a last resort solution. 
In order to avoid a gap between the desired objectives and reality, a strong political 
commitment from both the national and European decision-makers is needed. 
4.4 Governance and funding 
At the Bruges Conference there was much convergence of opinion on governance. The 
Board of the European Resolution Authority must be fully independent from the ECB in 
order to avoid conflicts of interest between supervision and resolution. The ECB has been 
very clear in its opinion on the SRM. “The ECB seeks representation in all plenary and 
executive meetings of the Single Resolution Board as an observer”, an observer deprived of 
any voting right, possibly in order to have direct and timely access to valuable information. 
The exact composition of this Board remains unknown. It seems advisable to include some 
independent non-executive members of the Board. 
The allocation of voting rights within the Board remains a sensitive matter as it is very often 
in European settings. There is an on-going discussion on this issue. At the end (but not too 
late) a compromise is expected and the time-table of the SRM could be respected. 
As far as funding is concerned there was also much convergence of views. The system has to 
be funded on an ex-ante basis through premia paid by banks. This is very similar to most 
deposit insurance schemes which are also “funded”, i.e. financed on an ex-ante basis. The 
premium paid by each bank has to be an increasing function of three factors: i) a scale 
variable such as the level of bank liabilities eligible for a bail-in; ii) the global bank risk, 
computed in aggregating credit, market and operational risks: a risk-based pricing is the way 
to deal with moral hazard; iii) the rate of global economic growth, taken as a proxy for the 
cycle. The positive relationship between premium and growth makes the system contra-
cyclical since banks pay more during the boom, less during the bust. 
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We have exactly the same questions and answers for premia for resolution and deposit 
insurance. For instance, who is actually paying the quasi- taxes and premia? Under certain 
competition circumstances, banks could transfer a part of or the entire bill to their 
customers, with higher lending rates and/or lower deposit rates. The similarity between the 
funding of resolution and the financing of deposit guarantee means that it is not surprising 
that some experts and policy-makers advocate their merger. However, it is preferable to 
start the BU with a distinct and transparent Resolution Fund. 
Several important questions concerning the governance and financing of resolution must be 
settled in the course of 2014 if we want to start the SRM at the beginning of 2015. Martin 
Merlin articulated some of these questions. Will the Commission be involved at some point 
in the resolution process? Here we need cost-benefit analysis which considers economic and 
political arguments. What should be the relationship between the European and the 
national resolution funds? Must the ESM, already involved in bank recapitalisation, be a 
backstop for the Resolution Fund? This last question illustrates the fact that the border 
between bail-in and bail-out, between private and public money is tenuous and has to be 
removed whenever the banking crisis reaches a certain threshold of intensity. 
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5. Deposit insurance 
So far deposit insurance, which is the third pillar of the BU, has drawn much less attention 
than the other pillars. There are at least two main reasons for the relative lack of attention. 
The time-table for pillar 3 is not very clear yet and in any case far delayed compared to the 
SSM and the SRM. Moreover the topic could be more sensitive from the viewpoint of 
national sovereignty than supervision and resolution which are already touchy issues. 
Before 2007-2008 there was a significant heterogeneity across EU countries with respect to 
deposit insurance. The crisis has precipitated some convergence, in particular for the ceiling 
of insured deposits (EUR 100,000). 
The Bruges Conference did not deal with deposit insurance as such. However, it should be 
expected that coordination between the national deposit insurance authorities and any 
European funds will become necessary. Moreover, cooperation will be necessary but not 
sufficient. In the medium and long-run, the EU will have to develop a more centralised 
system such as a FDIC-like European Insurance Fund. The main reason is the non-separability 
principle mentioned earlier. In the steady-state regime, the three pillars of the BU are not 
separable from each other. A subsequent question will be whether to keep the Resolution 
Fund and the Deposit Insurance Fund totally apart in order to avoid overlapping and possible 
conflicts of interest or to merge them for the sake of coordination and potential economies 
of scale. In the US which is more of an example than of a model, the FDIC is also deeply 
involved in the resolution of banks by addressing bank failures through mergers and 
acquisitions. 
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6. Other structural issues 
6.1 The ins and the outs 
It has been very clearly said that the BU is open to Member States which are not in the 
eurozone. Some Member States such as Poland seem to be interested in joining whereas the 
UK and Sweden are very likely to stay outside. In a recent speech (5 November 2013), Jörg 
Asmussen, member of the Executive Board of the ECB, pointed out that the BU is “essential 
for the ins and desirable for the outs”. If they join, the outs would participate on equal terms 
as euro countries to ensure a level playing field between the ins and the outs. They would 
also participate in the governance of the banking union in a way which yet remains to be 
determined. Conversely, due to the non-separability principle, the BU is a “package”. It is not 
possible to be a member of one or two pillars without accepting the other(s). 
6.2 The separation of bank activities 
The crisis has opened a contentious debate on banking activities and whether it is necessary 
for the supervisory authorities to implement some “Chinese walls” between some of them. 
In the US the Dodd-Frank Act and in particular the Volcker rule (2010) took the option of a 
“soft” separation between banks and hedge funds. It is “soft” since this re-regulation of 
banking activities in the US is much less ambitious than the Glass-Steagall Act (1933). In 
Europe, the Vickers report in the UK and the Liikanen Group mandated by the Commission 
went further in their recommendations by advocating a strong separation between 
commercial banking and trading activities. This regulatory requirement is parallel to the 
transition to a BU, but they are not independent from each other and they will interact since 
the structure of the banking industry conditions the way supervision, resolution and deposit 
insurance could be implemented. 
At the Bruges Conference, Jan Pieter Krahnen (Goethe University and member of the 
Liikanen Group) opened the debate about the cost-benefits of separation and the way to 
implement it concretely. The objective is clear. It is to bring back market discipline into the 
system. 
However, its justification is open for debate. Goodhart recalls that, at the start, the subprime 
crisis was very classical: the outburst of a real estate bubble. It had nothing to do with 
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proprietary trading. Implementing the separation will be complex. On the one hand, 
separation between commercial banking and trading addresses two major challenges. 
i) Time-inconsistency: banking is long-term while trading is short-term. ii) The distribution of 
risks, which raises several problems such as transparency, traceability, risk shifting. 
On the other hand, however, banking and trading are so intimately connected that a full 
separation is not warranted. As J.P. Krahnen put it, “…up to a certain level, trading and 
banking go well together”. Trading is much larger than proprietary trading. 
But it is not always easy to separate market making from proprietary trading. Professor 
Krahnen pointed out to the Liikanen recommendation concerning mandatory issues of junior 
bank debt. Given the development of new forms of investment banking, he insisted on the 
necessity of being very pragmatic when implementing some separation of bank activities. 
Monique Goyens, also member of the Liikanen Group, observed that “…the risks that are 
being taken in the financial area should be borne by those who take them or who allow 
them to be taken.” She added: “… recommendations of the Liikanen Group are good for civil 
society or for people”. Klaus Trömel was especially concerned about the distribution of risks 
and the inherent difficulty to trace them. With one form or another of separation, where will 
the risks be allocated? What is the best place to manage them? To ask those questions is not 
a way to condemn separation but it is an appeal for more academic research and more 
empirical (and historical) studies. 
The debate about separation is still not over in Europe. Some Member States (e.g. France) 
have taken regulatory initiatives even before the Liikanen report was out. We have to avoid 
any significant discrepancies across countries in the implementation of the proposals in the 
Liikanen report. Otherwise, there will be no level playing field which is a core objective of the 
single market and one of the goals of the BU. 
6.3 The financing of the real economy 
The main challenge of the on-going re-regulation process is the following. How to strengthen 
the banking and financial sector and to contain systemic risks without jeopardising the 
financing of the real economy, growth and employment? An application of this general 
consideration is the transition from Basel II to Basel III and its implications for investment 
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and growth. What is at stake is the good calibration of the new prudential rules. The 
problem was alluded to at Bruges but not further elaborated. Commissioner Barnier 
mentioned that the European Commission was instrumental in inducing the Basel 
Supervision Committee early 2013 to adjust the definition of the LCR (liquidity coverage 
ratio) in a direction more favourable to bank financing. Possible adjustments in the long-
term liquidity ratio (NSFR for net stable funding ratio) could occur in the short term. In any 
case the business model of banks is likely to change with the capping of bank maturity 
mismatch generated by the conjunction of the two liquidity ratios. Klaus Trömel questioned 
the financing of SMEs in the new regulatory environment whilst Charles Goodhart drew 
attention to the usual tendency of regulation to be pro-cyclical, and the necessity to make it 
more contra-cyclical and to induce more bank financing during a bust or a recession. 
The impact of Basel III on the quantity and quality of bank financing is critical for European 
economies which are mostly “bank-based” (the UK being a “market-based” financial system, 
which is an exception in Europe). Since we cannot assume that market financing or private 
equity will automatically substitute for bank financing if it becomes one way or another 
more selective and scarce, the capability of Europe to rebound in terms of investment and 
growth is at stake. We must not forget either that the implementation of the new prudential 
rules at the world level could generate a non-cooperative game (some countries staying 
apart from the new rules), which could lead us very far from the ideal configuration of the 
level playing field. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
At present, Europe is the “low pressure” zone in the world economy, posting low growth, 
and high global and youth unemployment. By itself the BU will not solve the challenges of 
the real economy. But it is an opportunity not only to improve the resilience of European 
finance but also to think and to act together for the long term, in a period of quasi-general 
myopia. The BU is much more than a purely technical project, much more than the addition 
of integrated supervision, resolution and deposit insurance. It is one of the few political 
economy perspectives that we have in common today. It deserves a strong commitment, 
discipline and continuity from policy makers at the European and national level 
notwithstanding essential electoral cycles. Since the BU project requires both research and 
support, the College of Europe at Bruges and the JRC (European Commission) intend to 
maintain and extend their cooperation in order to deepen and exchange views and 
knowledge on the evolution of financial regulation in light of the crisis. As Dominique Ristori 
(JRC) said in Bruges in April 2013, “in order to succeed in the implementation of the banking 
union, we need strong political decisions. But science has a lot to contribute too.” 
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